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Much of the recent research on civil war treats explanations rooted in political and economic grievances with consider-
able suspicion and claims that there is little empirical evidence of any relationship between ethnicity or inequality and
political violence. We argue that common indicators used in previous research, such as the ethno-linguistic fractionaliza-
tion (ELF) and the Gini coefficient for income dispersion, fail to capture fundamental aspects of political exclusion and
economic inequality that can motivate conflict. Drawing on insights from group-level research, we develop new country-
level indices that directly reflect inequalities among ethnic groups, including political discrimination and wealth differen-
tials along ethnic lines. Our analysis reveals that these theoretically informed country profiles are much better predictors
of civil war onset than conventional inequality indicators, even when we control for a number of alternative factors poten-
tially related to grievances or opportunities for conflict.
Despite decades of scientific debate and numerous cross-
national studies, the link between inequality and internal
conflict remains persistently contested and frustratingly
unclear. This assessment remains as valid today as in the
late 1980s, when Lichbach (1989) published a compre-
hensive but inconclusive review of the literature. Whether
framed as a Marxist proposition (Boswell and Dixon
1993) or a psychologically inspired thesis along the lines
of “relative deprivation” (Gurr 1970), the idea that
inequality triggers civil war and other forms of political
violence has drawn plenty of criticism (for example, Tilly
1978; Skocpol 1979). More recently, many other promi-
nent studies of civil war fail to uncover any systematic
relationship and reject the influence of inequality
together with other grievance-related explanations more
generally (for example, Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon
and Laitin 2003; though see also Boix 2008; Cederman,
Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011; Østby 2008).2 We argue
that the contradictory findings of the civil war literature
to a large extent stem from the use of empirical measures
of inequality and grievances that lack strong theoretical
justification and of assumptions of causal homogeneity
that fail to distinguish between different types of internal
conflict. In trying to “push square pegs through round
holes,” scholars of civil war have failed to adequately op-
erationalize both the independent and dependent vari-
ables in the grievance–conflict nexus.
To overcome these limitations, we propose replacing
conventional individualist measures of grievances with
new indicators that more clearly tap plausible political
and economic inequalities at the group level, thus shift-
ing the analytical focus from so-called vertical inequality
to horizontal inequality. This study is certainly not the
first to advocate that a group perspective can inform our
understanding of civil war (see, for example, Gurr 1993;
Regan and Norton 2005; Stewart 2008), and a number of
recent empirical studies have examined the effect of
ethno-political and economic inequalities on civil war
onset (for example, Østby 2008; Hegre, Østby and
Raleigh 2009; Østby, Nordas and Rød 2009; Cederman
et al. 2011). However, many of these studies are restricted
in geographic scope, and most consider groups or other
subnational entities as the units of analysis. As such, they
do not lend themselves easily to comparison with the
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country-oriented civil war literature at large nor allow
comparison with the risk of civil war for countries without
ethnic cleavages.
Our study is the first to combine an explicit group
focus in theory building and data generation with propo-
sitions and an empirical framework that identify specific
country profiles associated with elevated conflict risk. In
so doing, we are able to capture the political underpin-
nings of social grievances, whether related to ethnic
exclusion from national politics or systematic differences
in economic opportunities and privileges between ethnic
groups. The subsequent statistical analysis draws on new
georeferenced economic and ethno-political data that
also help remedy severe missing data problems character-
izing most earlier comparative research on inequality and
conflict. Crucially, the country-level approach allows us to
systematically compare our group-based inequality mea-
sures with standard indicators of vertical inequality.
Unlike group-level analyses, we can consider non-ethnic
as well as ethnic civil wars. Finally, we can evaluate the
scale sensitivity of findings from subnational studies and
to what extent these can be scaled up and replicated at
the country level.
We find strong evidence that horizontal inequality and
ethno-political discrimination matter. Countries with one
or more ethnic group(s) radically poorer than the
national average and countries with large groups discrimi-
nated from national politics have a significantly higher
risk of armed anti-governmental opposition. Moreover,
we find that horizontal economic inequality is primarily
associated with separatist attempts whereas widespread
ethno-political discrimination appears to motivate chal-
lengers targeting central governmental power. In con-
trast, traditional proxies for individual-level grievances in
a society, such as the Gini coefficient of income disparity
and various fractionalization indices, have either no or
much weaker impacts on the risk of civil war. We also
show that our more theoretically informed grievance
measures yield better out-of-sample predictions than do
conventional models of civil war. Sensitivity tests reveal
that these results cannot be dismissed as artifacts of a nar-
row conceptualization of conflict or inequality or a result
of a specific sampling strategy.
We proceed as follows. We first review the literature on
inequality, grievances, and civil war, with particular atten-
tion to common arguments for dismissing the role of
grievances in conflict. We discuss the difference between
vertical and horizontal inequality and argue that political
and economic inequalities that coincide with group cleav-
ages are much more likely to lead to violent mobilization
than interpersonal inequalities unrelated to social struc-
tures. The following two sections provide a detailed dis-
cussion of our empirical measures and a presentation of
the empirical analysis, before we conclude.
Inequality, Grievances, and Political Violence
The role of grievances in conflict research attracted criti-
cal scrutiny long before Collier and Hoeffler (2004) pit-
ted “grievances” against “greed” as explanations of civil
war. In contemporary conflict research, grievances are
normally associated with relative deprivation theory,
which postulates that frustration in response to failed
material expectations tend to produce violence through
psychological mechanisms (Gurr 1970; see also Davies
1962; Huntington 1968; Muller and Seligson 1987). Tilly
(1978) and other resource mobilization theorists question
the explanatory power of such grievance-based accounts
of political violence (see also Muller 1972; Oberschall
1978; Skocpol 1979). In particular, these critics argue
that frustrations are simply too common to plausibly
account for outbreaks of violence, especially since protest
can be easily thwarted by powerful governments. There-
fore, explanations of collective political violence need to
gauge nonstate challengers’ access to material and orga-
nizational resources rather than interpreting their motiva-
tions, which this line of reasoning deems to be largely
irrelevant. More recent quantitative research on civil war
tends to reach similar conclusions, although this litera-
ture consists mostly of cross-national comparative panel
studies of civil wars involving the state as opposed to the
focus on broader forms of political instability or dynamics
of escalation in earlier sociological research (cf. new stud-
ies on micro-dynamics of civil war, for example, Kalyvas
2006; Tarrow 2007).3
How do researchers contributing to the empirical
country-level literature on civil war attempt to capture
grievances? Without pretending to exhaust all possibili-
ties, we can divide the arguments into two main dimen-
sions, namely those that focus on ethno-political and
economic grievances, respectively.
Ethno-Political Grievances
The difficulty of measuring grievances directly has led
many researchers to investigate how structural features
such as societal divisions can generate violent conflict.
Although different types of cleavages, including class-
based ones, can theoretically be linked to conflict onset,
the most obvious alternative is to focus on ethnic distinc-
tions because of their ascriptive and highly visible nature
as well as their clear importance in many actual conflicts
(Horowitz 1985; Sambanis 2001).4 However, arguments
linking ethnicity to conflict are usually not associated with
a distinctive set of causal mechanisms, and many remain
quite vague. Political economists have long suspected that
ethnic diversity leads to instability and unrest. In a classi-
cal study, Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) contend that eth-
nic pluralism is usually incompatible with democratic
stability. More recently, a series of studies suggest that
ethnically diverse societies harbor difficult-to-solve conten-
tion deriving from diverging preferences and differential
skills and habits (for overviews, see Alesina and La Ferr-
ara 2005; Kanbur, Rajaram and Varshney 2010). Drawing
on sociobiological reasoning about ethnic groups, Vanha-
nen (1999) reaches a similar conclusion on ethnicity and
nepotism. Based on an extensive cross-national sample,
he finds that significant ethnic divisions tend to produce
violent conflict. More broadly, Sambanis (2001) and Fea-
ron and Laitin (2003) associate ethnic diversity with a lar-
ger class of arguments outlining the role of ethnic and
nationalist grievances in conflict processes, whether pro-
foundly primordialist like Vanhanen’s argument, or
explicitly modernist along the lines of Gellner (1983),
Anderson (1991), and other prominent theorists of
nationalism.
Ethnic fractionalization is the most common choice of
indicator to test arguments linking ethnicity to conflict.
3 Our characterization here does not apply to all quantitative civil war
scholarship, and we identify and discuss some notable exceptions below.
4 Other potentially relevant social cleavages that we do not pursue further
here due to lack of good data include caste, clans, and narrow religious move-
ments (for example, Mormonism and Salafism).
Halvard Buhaug, Lars-Erik Cederman and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch 419
Fractionalization indices are operationalized in accor-
dance with Herfindahl’s formula, which can be inter-
preted as the probability that two randomly selected
individuals in a population belong to different groups.
Initially introduced by Easterly and Levine (1997) in a
study of economic development, the so-called ethno-
linguistic fractionalization indices (ELF) are usually com-
puted with data from the old Soviet ethnographic Atlas
Narodov Mira. However, fractionalization indices can in
principle be computed with other group definitions that
reflect alternative and/or separate dimensions of ethnic-
ity, including language and religion (see, for example,
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg
2003; Fearon 2003).
Some researchers have suggested alternative curvilinear
relationships between diversity and conflict, where the
risk of conflict will be lower at very high or low levels of
fractionalization (for example, Sambanis 2001; Collier
and Hoeffler 2004). Others have argued that it is not so
much diversity that increases the risk of conflict but
polarization, especially a situation where two large ethnic
groups face one another (Forsberg 2008; Horowitz 1985;
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005; Østby 2008). Although
these arguments are clearly distinct and suggest different
empirical measures, they are essentially pure diversity
measures that look at the demographic size of groups
rather than their political status as the origin of insecurity
and conflict.
The conflict literature has so far failed to yield a clear
picture with regard to the effect of ethnicity on civil con-
flict. Whereas some authors find evidence of a positive
effect of ethnic diversity on conflict, including Sambanis
(2001) and Hegre and Sambanis (2006), other influential
studies find no effect at all (for example, Fearon and
Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Since fractional-
ization often has been seen as a general proxy for ethno-
political grievances, many researchers have concluded
that ethnic grievances have little or no explanatory
power. Surveying up the recent literature, Laitin (2007:
25) argues that
ethnic grievances are commonly felt and latent; the
factors that make these grievances vital and manifest
differentiate the violent from the nonviolent cases. Ex
ante measures of grievance levels are not good predic-
tors of the transformation of latent grievances into
manifest ones. And it is the factor that turns latent
grievances into violent action that should be consid-
ered as explanatory for that violence.
Despite such attempts to dismiss grievances as irrele-
vant for explaining conflict, our first hypothesis expresses
the general expectation from individual-level arguments
relating to ethno-political grievances:
Hypothesis 1: The probability of civil war increases with ethnic
diversity.
Economic Grievances
The classical formulation of relative deprivation inspired
by Davies (1962) assumes that conflict-inducing frustra-
tions stem from a gap between actual outcomes and aspi-
rations (Gurr 1970). However, relative deprivation can
also be defined in relation to differences to wealthier
members of a society. Income inequality is the most obvi-
ous way to measure grievances based on interpersonal
wealth comparisons. Of course, Marxist interpretations of
political violence as direct consequences of class conflict
constitute the locus classicus (see, for example, Bosswell
and Dixon 1993). Beyond this ideologically explicit theo-
rizing, a long-standing tradition of studies in comparative
politics and sociology focus on peasant rebellions target-
ing radically asymmetric land distribution in the develop-
ing world (for example, Russett 1964; Moore 1966; Scott
1976). For example, in an influential study, Booth (1991)
argues that persistent inequality and exploitation of peas-
ants by rich landowners in Central America triggered rev-
olutionary challenges to incumbent regimes in the 1970s
and 1980s. Focusing on conflict during this period, Booth
(1991: 34) claims that
economic development trends worsened the region’s
historically extreme maldistribution of wealth and
income, intensifying grievances among negatively
affected class groups. … Such problems led the
aggrieved to demand change and sparked growing
opposition to incumbent regimes by political parties,
labor unions, religious community organizers, and rev-
olutionary groups. Violent repression of opposition
demands for reform … not only failed to suppress
mobilization for change but actually helped forge revo-
lutionary coalitions that fought for control of the state.
In this account, we can identify a distinctive causal
chain starting with persistent inequality leading to griev-
ances among the peasant population fueling demands for
political change and redistribution. Denied such reforms,
and possibly even encountering state-led repression, the
aggrieved will see little choice but to rebel.
Because it is exceedingly difficult to measure griev-
ances directly in a large-N cross-country setting, most rele-
vant statistical studies rely on structural indicators of
individual or household income inequality. The most
widely applied such measure is the Gini coefficient,
reflecting the extent to which the observed income distri-
bution differs from an equal distribution, with higher
values indicating greater inequality.5 Using this indicator
as a proxy for economic grievances, the most prominent
studies of civil war find no evidence of a link between
economic inequality and conflict. While acknowledging
some possible data problems, these scholars interpret this
non-finding as a confirmation that grievances are largely
irrelevant for explaining civil war (Fearon and Laitin
2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004).
Boix (2008) refines the standard argument about
inequality and conflict by considering the impact of fac-
tor mobility. According to his logic, conflict is likely only
in those cases where inequality relates to immobile
resources since wealthy elites are unable to move their
wealth abroad should political change threaten their
assets. Relying on structural measures of landownership
rather than comparisons of income levels directly, Boix
reports strong support for a link between differences in
wealth and conflict. Likewise, influential formal politico-
economic models that take classes or social interests as
actors, such as Acemoglou and Robinson (2006), postu-
late a strong relationship between income distributions,
preferences for redistribution, and incentives for violent
revolution.
5 Other studies, such as Muller and Seligson (1987), have relied on alter-
native measures of income distributions such as the share of income held by
the poorest or wealthiest percentiles. These measures are also based entirely
on the observed income distribution for individuals or households.
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The following hypothesis captures the preceding argu-
ments:
Hypothesis 2: The probability of civil war increases with eco-
nomic inequality among individuals.
The conventional literature that pitches explanations
of civil war outbreak either at the individual level or more
generally at the level of entire societies says little about
substate actors and structures operating between these
two levels, such as ethnic groups and organizations. This
lacuna may explain the divergent findings and lack of
support for a relationship between grievances and civil
war. We now turn to theories that specifically highlight
the group-level perspective.
Linking Group-level Inequality and Grievances to Civil
War
As we have seen, the most prevalent proxies for griev-
ances depend on individualist principles and are insensi-
tive to other social cleavages or group structures.
However, civil wars are not primarily fought between indi-
viduals, but between governments and organized nonstate
groups. According to Stewart (2008: 11):
the majority of internal conflicts are organized group
conflicts—they are neither exclusively nor primarily a
matter of individuals committing acts of violence
against others. What is most often involved is group
mobilization of people with particular shared identi-
ties or goals to attack others in the name of the
group.
In order to capture this important distinction, Stewart
contrasts vertical inequality (VI) among individuals (VI)
with the notion of horizontal inequality (HI) across
groups. More specifically, HIs are defined as “inequalities
in economic, social or political dimensions or cultural sta-
tus between culturally defined groups” (p. 3). Of the four
dimensions conceptualized by Stewart, we will focus on
the economic and political aspects of horizontal inequal-
ity, which can be contrasted directly to vertical income
inequality as a measure of economic grievances, and eth-
nic fractionalization as an indicator for ethno-political
grievances.
Of course, the cohesion of ethnic groups cannot be
taken for granted across the board (Brubaker 1996)—
defection may occur in many cases (Kalyvas 2006) and
identities sometimes shift as a result of conflict (Gurr
1993)—but social psychological theory offers strong rea-
sons to believe that individuals often identify through
groups (see Tajfel and Turner 1979). Rather than relying
on direct personal relations, the massive scale of social
systems in the modern world leaves actors little choice
but to rely on categorization to simplify reality (Gellner
1964). Mass media, education, and other identity-confer-
ring mechanisms allow political institutions to foster
collective identities that often are associated with consid-
erable emotional commitment. Political ideologies, espe-
cially those appealing to nationalist values, can engender
a strong sense of solidarity. In such cases, individual pref-
erences are trumped by collective motivations, implying
that the individual acts on behalf of the group and is will-
ing to make major sacrifices in the name of collective
identities and abstract ideological principles (Anderson
1991).
Ethno-Political Grievances
Arguments hinging on ethnic diversity, measured
through fractionalization and other individual-based
indices, fail to capture group-level grievances and are
thus poor proxies for most established theories of eth-
nic conflict and nationalism. Instead of focusing on
merely ethno-demographic properties, it makes more
sense to articulate an explicitly political account that
characterizes the relationship between the ethnic group
(s) in power and those that are excluded from access
to executive power (Cederman and Girardin 2007).
Importantly, tapping the political configuration of eth-
nicity implicitly also entails a temporal dynamic, since
hold on national power and other political privileges in
a society—unlike relative group sizes—can change over
short time periods.
The French Revolution initiated a new era in world
politics that made nationalism the dominant source of
political legitimacy. The limited social intrusiveness of
pre-nationalist states meant that borders could be
adjusted primarily according to the geopolitical demands,
but this flexibility was undermined in a system emphasiz-
ing that cultural and political borders should coincide
(Gellner 1983). Fierce competition broke out in areas
characterized by intersecting ethnic and political bound-
aries once the state became the coveted prize of aspiring
national movements. By excluding entire ethnic groups
from power, incumbent elites were able to hoard power
and limit the distribution of the spoils to the in-group.
Yet, despite the immediate advantages accruing to the
favored group, such exclusionary policies are likely to
trigger conflict as grievances grow among the powerless
and discriminated parts of the population (Gurr 1993;
Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010).
This process requires a fair amount of political mobili-
zation and leadership in order for a sense of moral out-
rage to spread in the concerned population. Indeed,
emotional commitment is clearly not enough, because
weak movements may be effectively crushed by powerful
governments. Thus, only rebel organizations that control
sufficient material and organizational resources are able
to challenge the state through violent means (Tilly 1978;
Regan and Norton 2005). Contrary to the beliefs of the
resource mobilization school, however, it does not auto-
matically follow that the effect of grievances is swamped
by power differentials. Instead, we postulate that the
stronger the emotional power of the grievances in the
first place, the more readily the rebels will be able to
overcome collective-action dilemmas blocking armed
resistance (Goldstone 2001; Emirbayer and Goldberg
2005). Since grievances in turn depend on the severity of
initial horizontal inequality, we arrive at the following
hypothesis that measures horizontal inequality in terms of
political discrimination:
Hypothesis 3: The probability of civil war increases with politi-
cal discrimination.
Note that this hypothesis highlights the degree of
discrimination in a country rather than merely focusing
on the size of the excluded population (cf. Wimmer,
Cederman and Min 2009). If the emotion-based mecha-
nism outlined above holds, we should be able to detect
an especially strong link between discrimination, viewed
as a subset of exclusionary policies, and conflict onset.
As our analysis is pitched at the level of entire coun-
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tries, which in many cases feature a large number of
excluded groups, discriminated groups should be espe-
cially important potential rebels, even if such groups
are often numerically small and carry little weight in
conventional aggregate measures of ethnic diversity at
the country level.
Below, we explore additional aspects of the ethno-polit-
ical environment, including the claim that a recent down-
grading of ethnic groups’ power status is particularly
conducive to conflict, as well as the possibility that politi-
cal power-sharing arrangements can undermine stability
and peace (for example, Jarstad and Nilsson 2008).
Economic Grievances
By now it should be clear that vertical inequality, mea-
sured as the Gini coefficient, cannot fully capture all rele-
vant dimensions of societal disparity. In a powerful
critique of such individual-level conceptions of inequality
that bears strong resemblance to Stewart’s notion of hori-
zontal inequality, Tilly (1999, 2007) advances a “rela-
tional” perspective that explains how durable inequality
results from categorical differences. In Tilly’s (2007: 9)
words, “a view of inequality as outcomes of individual-by-
individual competition according to widely shared stan-
dards of merit, worthiness, or privilege obscures the sig-
nificance of organized distinctions and interactions
among members of different social categories.” Rather
than being a mere reflection of differences in skills or
changes in the supply of resources, then, inequality thus
conceived can be seen as an outcome of “politics of
exclusion” whereby political elites restrict distribution
conditional on social categories or groups.
The explicit role played by political agency points
directly to how wealth discrepancies may trigger political
violence. The road from inequality to conflict leads via
grievances, which can be seen as reactions to perceived
injustice. Objective resource asymmetries are known to
emerge in many ways, including through colonialism and
internal domination (Williams 2003: 106–107), but do
not themselves suffice to produce grievances. Members of
disadvantaged groups must first be made conscious of
their predicament through explicit intergroup compari-
son and convinced that the unequal distribution of
wealth is not merely unjust, but also to be blamed on the
state’s incumbent elite (Gamson 1992).
Again, we expect other factors to influence the likeli-
hood of conflict, including most importantly the power
of the nonstate challenger vis-a-vis the incumbent state
(for example, Butler and Gates 2009; Buhaug 2010).
However, as argued in connection with Hypothesis 3, if
the causal process is mediated by a grievance mecha-
nism, the extent of structural inequality in a society
should have a discernible impact on the outbreak of vio-
lent conflict.
In contrast to the at best mixed results of the large-N
studies focusing on vertical inequality, Horowitz (1985)
forcefully argues that both “backward” and “advanced”
groups are overrepresented as conflict groups and pro-
vides case studies to support his claims. Likewise, Stewart
(2008) reports on a series of case studies that strongly
support the importance of horizontal inequalities. Using
survey data from Africa, Østby (2008) and Hegre et al.
(2009) have also been able to find confirming evidence
for the thesis at the group level. More recently, Ceder-
man et al. (2011) provide further support using spatial
methods for deriving global estimates of wealth distribu-
tion and horizontal inequalities from disaggregated eco-
nomic data.
We are now in a position to formulate our last hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: The probability of civil war increases with eco-
nomic horizontal inequality.
This section has shown that the recent literature pro-
vides ample evidence that political and economic hori-
zontal inequality increase conflict risk, but so far, these
results either have been limited to parts of the world due
to data problems or relate to subnational units (groups
or geographic areas) with little consideration of country-
level dynamics. Likewise, earlier attempts to link ethnic
grievances to civil war at the country level ignore the
political configuration of ethnicity, whereas disaggregated
(group-level) studies of ethno-political marginalization
are limited to considering ethnic conflict and must by
design exclude countries where ethnicity carries no politi-
cal relevance.
This study provides the first truly global cross-country
assessment of how intergroup inequalities in economic
and political privileges are associated with civil war out-
break. In so doing, we will also assess whether the hypoth-
eses advanced in disaggregated studies hold at the
country level and what types of aggregate indicators are
best suited to capture the theoretical arguments associ-
ated with horizontal inequality. Once such indicators
have been found, we can compare their performance
directly to established country-level correlates of civil
war and assess their contribution to our ability to predict
conflict out of sample. We now turn to these tasks.
Methods and Measurements
Our four hypotheses are evaluated empirically through a
country-level regression analysis of civil war involvement
among all members of the international system, 1960–
2005 (see Gleditsch and Ward 1999). This seeming depar-
ture from the recent trend toward disaggregating civil
war (Cederman and Gleditsch 2009) might seem counter-
intuitive as the logic underlying our theoretical frame-
work explicitly refers to social groups within countries.
However, our country-level approach here is complimen-
tary and not inherently incompatible with a disaggregated
focus. First, as we explain in further detail below, our
operational measures of horizontal inequality build on
the notion of the “weakest link” whereby conflict risk is
considered a function of the relative discrepancy in
wealth or privileges between the national average and the
most marginalized group in society. Second, many social
science phenomena and correlations are scale depen-
dent, in the sense that apparent patterns in the data at
one resolution or level of analysis may disappear or
change at other scales.6 Generating country-aggregated
indicators from group-specific data thus permits evaluat-
ing the scale dependence of earlier findings (for exam-
ple, Buhaug, Cederman and Rød 2008). Moreover, and
importantly, it also facilitates comparing the performance
of intergroup inequality with standard (vertical) inequal-
ity measures at the country level. Countries are arguably
the most relevant units of observation for risk profiles as
6 For example, population size and oil dependence are found to increase
a country’s baseline civil war risk (Fearon and Laitin 2003), but it does not
necessarily follow that subnational conflict risk is highest in the most densely
populated or oil abundant regions of a country (Buhaug and Rød 2006).
422 Inequalities, Grievances, and Civil War
well as forecasting, as available projected input data on
core features such as economic development, democrati-
zation, and demographic changes almost exclusively per-
tain to countries (cf. Goldstone, Bates, Epstein, Gurr,
Lustik, Marshall, Ulfelder and Woodward 2010; Hegre,
Karlsen, Mokleiv Nygard, Urdal and Strand 2013).
Data on civil war onset and ethnic group involvement
are derived from the Non-State Actor data set (Cunning-
ham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009), which in turn is
based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset,
henceforth ACD (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sol-
lenberg and Strand 2002; Themner and Wallensteen
2011). The link from organizations to the ethnic groups
in the Ethnic Power Relations data (Cederman et al.
2010) was established through the ACD2EPR coding
project. We use the most inclusive definition of civil war,
counting all conflicts between a state and one or more
rebel groups that generated at least 25 battle-related
deaths in a calendar year. We use two alternative depen-
dent variables (DVs). The first is a standard binary indica-
tor, where civil war onset is coded in the initial year of a
new armed intrastate conflict and after a lull in fighting
in excess of two calendar years (183 observations). In
addition, we use a four-category onset indicator that sepa-
rates between onsets of different conflict types (no onset
is the reference group, coded zero):
1. Ethnic territorial conflict, 55 observations;
2. Ethnic governmental conflict, 42 observations; and
3. Non-ethnic conflict, 86 observations.7
The classification of territorial and governmental con-
flict is based on the ACD incompatibility indicator. Fur-
thermore, conflicts are considered ethnic if a rebel group
makes claims on behalf of a specific ethnic community
and recruitment is based on ethnic affiliation. For both
variants of the dependent variable, subsequent years of
conflict activity are coded as zero except where a new
conflict breaks out.8 For sensitivity tests, we also use Fea-
ron and Laitin’s (2003) civil war data, which we classify in
the same conflict subcategories based on their identifica-
tion of ethnic/non-ethnic and center/exit wars.
We consider a number of potential proxies for ethnic
grievances and inequality. The models presented below
feature standard, individual-based measures of ethnic and
economic diversity: Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) ethnic
fractionalization index (ELF) and a Gini index of income
dispersion (World Income Inequality Database, WIID).
To minimize missing data problems in the WIID data, we
apply linear interpolation between data points and
extended the time series by copying the earliest/latest
known value to earlier/later years by country.
Measures of horizontal economic inequality were gen-
erated through a number of steps. First, we calculated
group-level data on wealth for all ethnic groups in all
countries by joining the G-Econ gridded data set on eco-
nomic activity (Nordhaus 2006) with the GeoEPR data set
on ethnic group settlements (Wucherpfennig, Weid-
mann, Girardin, Cederman and Wimmer 2011).9 We then
identified the richest and poorest group in each country,
from which we constructed country-level inequality indica-
tors that capture the relative gap between the mean
national income and the income level for the poorest
and richest group, respectively:10
NHI: Negative horizontal inequality = country-level
GDP per capita/mean per capita income for poorest
group.
PHI: Positive horizontal inequality = mean per capita
income for richest group/country-level GDP per
capita.
Since the G-Econ data represent the year 1990 and are
time invariant, our economic inequality variables are sta-
tic. This is unfortunate as we know that almost all coun-
tries experienced considerable economic growth during
the sample period, and growth rates vary between cases
and over time as well. Yet, this limitation may be accept-
able if we do not have strong reason to believe that the
spatial distribution of poverty and wealth changes signifi-
cantly over time also within countries. Lack of good
subnational data on economic activity hinders a compr-e-
hensive assessment of this issue, but much research sug-
gests that social inequalities are often persistent, implying
that static georeferenced income data may be less prob-
lematic than intuitively assumed (see, for example, Tilly
1999; Stewart and Langer 2008). For India, one of a
handful of countries with reliable time-series data on eco-
nomic activity at a subnational level, we have nearly iden-
tical economic growth rates for all states during the last
30 years, according to statistics from the Reserve Bank of
India (see supplementary information for details). A simi-
lar stationary ordering of poor versus rich regions is evi-
dent in France (Combes, Lafourcade, Thisse and Toutain
2011), and other countries such as the Yugoslav Federa-
tion and the Sudan also seem to be well represented by
the G-Econ data (Lang 1975; Buhaug, Gleditsch, Holter-
mann, Østby and Tollefsen 2011).11
A potentially more challenging problem is the possibil-
ity of reverse causality, as relative poverty at the group
level may reflect past conflict. In other work (Buhaug
et al. 2011), we have explored the relationship between
local economic activity and conflict in detail and con-
ducted various sensitivity tests such as limiting the analysis
to the post-1990 period and accounting for (or exclud-
ing) areas that have hosted armed conflict in the past.
These tests failed to reveal strong indication of an endog-
enous relationship between conflict and income.12 From
a policy perspective, a predictive link between economic
marginalization and elevated conflict risk is in itself of
considerable importance, regardless of the underlying
reasons why economic inequality arose in the first place.
7 There is little value in disaggregating outcome category 3 with respect to
incompatibility as virtually all non-ethnic civil wars fall in the governmental
conflict category.
8 Our definition of defining civil war implies that a country may host sev-
eral distinct armed conflicts at the same time, involving distinct groups or
incompatibilities (examples include Ethiopia, India, Myanmar, and Yugosla-
via). Recoding observations with ongoing conflict as missing (that is, consider-
ing civil war countries not at risk of facing another challenger) does not
substantively affect the results presented here.
9 See Buhaug et al. (2008) for further documentation on how group-spe-
cific estimates can be constructed from spatial data by means of geographic
information systems (GIS) software.
10 In ethnically homogenous countries (for example, North Korea) and
countries where ethnicity has no distinct spatial dimension (for example,
Rwanda), these measures take on the value 1.
11 Note that the problem of restricted temporal domain applies with equal
force to the common proxies for vertical inequality. Most measures of ethnic
fractionalization are based on Soviet data from the 1960s, whereas Gini mea-
sures of income inequality often depend on heavy interpolation and extrapo-
lation.
12 We do not dispute that major wars can have devastating and long-last-
ing impacts on the local and national economy, but few of the armed intra-
state conflicts included in this analysis reach this magnitude.
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To our knowledge, the G-Econ-based indicators constitute
the only available data of intergroup inequality with a
global coverage.
Our second intergroup grievance indicator captures
systematic inequality in ethno-political opportunities,
based on the Ethnic Power Relations data (Wimmer et al.
2009). The EPR project identifies political status for all
politically relevant ethnic groups worldwide for all years
since 1946. In this study, we focus on political discrimina-
tion as a potential source of ethnic grievance. At the
country level, we consider the demographic size of
the largest discriminated ethnic group (LDG) relative to
the joint size of the discriminated group and the group
(s) in power. This variable is naturally bounded within
the interval [0, 1]. We further include two dummy
variables to control for additional aspects of the ethno-
political context. The first indicator flags whether one or
more ethnic group(s) in the country lost political status
during the preceding year (downgrade).13 Second, we
identify country years where the political system is
founded on a division of executive power between leaders
of different ethnic groups (power-sharing).
Figure 1 compares our group-based indices with con-
ventional measures of ethnic and economic dispersion.
Evidently, economic marginalization of ethnic minorities
may be substantial even in countries with seemingly egali-
tarian wealth structures (for example, Russia). Similarly,
discrimination of large ethnic groups is found in rela-
tively homogenous (polarized) as well as very heteroge-
neous societies. We also note that many of the
observations with high intergroup economic/political
inequality scores (vertical axes) have a recent history of
intrastate conflict.
In addition to the various inequality and dispersion
measures, we consider a number of control variables that
conceivably may be correlated with both horizontal
inequality and conflict: logged GDP per capita (Heston,
Summers and Aten 2009), democracy (Gates, Hegre,
Jones and Strand 2006), and logged population size (Hes-
ton, Summers and Aten 2009). In addition, to account
for possible serial dependence and a different risk pat-
tern for countries already involved in intrastate fighting,
we include a civil war lag indicator.14 All controls are
lagged by 1 year to minimize bias from possible reverse
causality.
Regression Analysis
We estimate a series of binary and multinomial logit
regressions to assess the hypotheses. We start with the
conventional binary civil war onset indicator as the
dependent variable. The first model, which we refer to as
the “VI Model,” is a standard model of civil war onset
that contains the ELF and Gini proxies for vertical
ethno-political and economic grievances plus controls.
The “HI Model” additionally includes group-based (hori-
zontal) measures of ethno-political discrimination and
economic inequality. The third model, or the “Extended
HI Model,” retains all right-hand-side regressors, but
replaces the standard civil war onset variable with the
four-category outcome variable that distinguishes between
different types of conflict. The results are displayed in
Table 1.
In line with some earlier research, Model 1 indicates
that ethnic diversity is positively correlated with civil war
onset. The estimated effect is quite large in substantive
terms and statistically significant. All other factors held at
median values, the predicted risk of civil is nearly three
times higher when ELF is at the 95th percentile
(ELF = 0.86) compared to the predicted value at the 5th
percentile (ELF = 0.03). Vertical income inequality, in
contrast, appears unrelated to civil war, in line with most
earlier studies. We also note that national political config-
uration is largely unrelated to the likelihood of civil war.
There is some indication of a parabolic effect of democ-
racy with semi-democracies being more conflict prone
(results not shown), although the results do not reach
statistically significance by conventional criteria (p > 0.1).
Consistent with Hegre and Sambanis (2006), we find that
population size and level of development have significant
positive and negative impacts on the risk of conflict in
the conventional VI Model.
In the HI Model, we introduce the new horizontal
grievance proxies as well as controls for power-sharing
among ethnic groups and downgrading of their power
status (see Model 2). We immediately note that the effect
of ethnic diversity drops by about 15% while individual
income inequality remains insignificant. More impor-
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FIG 1. Vertical Versus Horizontal Inequality, Year 2000
13 The EPR data set classifies politically relevant ethnic groups into one of
seven possible categories according to their extent of access to central state
power: monopoly, dominant, senior partner, junior partner, regional auton-
omy, powerless, and discriminated. Any shift downwards on this hierarchical
ladder implies political downgrading.
14 The results do not change if we replace the lagged conflict incidence
dummy with Beck, Katz and Tucker’s (1998) non-parametric approach to time
dependence conditional on years at peace or time since independence.
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ment with Hypothesis 3, regimes founded on political dis-
crimination of sizable ethnic groups are disproportion-
ately involved in civil war, and the magnitude of the
effect is on par with that of ELF. Moreover, the HI Model
supports our expectation that countries with economi-
cally highly marginalized groups are more conflict prone
(see Hypothesis 4). We find little evidence that relative
wealth increases conflict risk, thus contrasting the near
symmetric U-shaped association between economic
inequality and conflict at the ethnic group level reported
by Cederman et al. 2011. Although we note that the latter
study is limited to ethnic conflicts in the post-Cold War
period, it remains to be determined whether the dis-
crepancy is also in part an aggregation effect. Interest-
ingly, including horizontal inequality also improves the
performance of GDP per capita by some margin.15 The
other covariates are largely unaffected by the inclusion of
the group-based grievance variables.
Models 1–2 offer empirical support for our claim that
intergroup inequalities matter more for civil war risk than
vertical disparities. Yet, not all conflicts are the same;
prior research has shown that territorial (that is, primarily
separatist) and governmental (that is, primarily revolu-
tionary) conflicts differ on several dimensions (Buhaug
2006). Similarly, conflicts may be categorized as either
ethnic or non-ethnic (the latter sometimes being referred
to as ideological; see Sambanis 2001). Aggregating all civil
wars could thus mask important differences in effects that
only pertain to a particular conflict type or run in oppo-
site direction across distinct types of conflicts (Sambanis
2004).
In the Extended HI Model, we estimate the effects of
the grievance proxies specifically for ethnic separatist
wars (outcome 1), ethnic governmental wars (2), and
non-ethnic wars (3), almost all of which are governmental
(see Model 3).16 The results are striking. ELF no longer
exhibits a significant effect with conventional levels of
confidence on any positive outcome (although the mar-
ginal impact for the point estimate on both ethnic con-
flict types—ignoring the large standard errors—remains
quite high). At the same time, the positive coefficient for
ethno-political discrimination nearly triples for ethnic
governmental conflicts compared with the basic HI
Model, while it remains insignificant for other conflict
types. Indeed, the elasticity of discrimination with respect
to DV outcome 2 amounts to a factor of five (estimated
civil war risk increases from less than 0.003 to 0.013 with
a shift from p5 to p95, all other variables held at their
median values). This result supports the expectation that
populous, politically discriminated ethnic groups are
more likely to seek to overthrow the ruling regime or
otherwise alter the political system through violent means
if necessary. Moreover, countries with one or more very
poor ethnic groups—which typically make up only a frac-
tion of the country population—are more likely to see
conflicts that aim for separation from the core or





(3) Extended HI model
Eth. terr. Eth. gov. Non-eth.
ELF 1.148** 0.974* 1.713 1.623 0.394
(0.424) (0.428) (0.977) (0.892) (0.521)
Gini 0.005 0.004 0.039 0.029 0.024*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.025) (0.025) (0.011)
LDG 1.288** 0.219 3.476** 0.666
(0.346) (0.830) (0.626) (0.588)
PHI 0.045 0.036 0.810 0.045
(0.175) (0.252) (0.857) (0.246)
NHI 0.321** 0.497** 0.082 0.201
(0.119) (0.161) (0.388) (0.215)
Downgrade 0.860** 1.391** 0.944 0.422
(0.255) (0.418) (0.526) (0.448)
Power-sharing 0.029 0.769 0.862* 0.062
(0.221) (0.484) (0.438) (0.314)
Democracy 0.176 0.350 1.374* 0.091 0.157
(0.319) (0.345) (0.607) (0.819) (0.452)
Population 0.249** 0.234** 0.408** 0.067 0.167
(0.069) (0.079) (0.123) (0.184) (0.101)
GDP per capita 0.382** 0.432** 0.773* 0.405 0.188
(0.140) (0.147) (0.329) (0.305) (0.194)
Civil War lag 0.161 0.026 0.193 1.022 0.168
(0.279) (0.298) (0.466) (0.992) (0.357)
Constant 5.968** 6.311** 8.511** 4.729* 7.216**
(0.782) (0.850) (1.729) (2.043) (1.095)
Pseudo-R2 .06 .08 .11
Observations 5,219 5,219 5,219
(Notes. Binary (1 & 2) and multinomial (3) logit coefficients with standard errors clustered on countries in parentheses. LDG = largest discriminated group;
PHI = positive horizontal inequality; NHI = negative horizontal inequality. **p < .01, * p < .05.)
15 The marginal impact of (negative) intergroup economic inequality
should be interpreted with some care, however, as the parameter estimate
shrinks significantly when the most unequal societies (Argentina, Russia, and
Thailand in some years) are removed from the sample.
16 Cf. Wimmer et al. (2009), who distinguish between secessionist and
non-secessionist conflicts. We prefer the distinction between territorial and
governmental conflicts since it circumvents the highly heterogeneous category
of non-secessionist conflicts.
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demand greater levels of autonomy rather that attempt-
ing to capture governmental power. This result actually
becomes stronger if we drop the outliers. Lastly, we find
some evidence for class-based mobilization in that higher
individual income inequality is positively associated with
the risk of non-ethnic, revolutionary civil war (see also
Goldstone 2001).
Overall, our analysis shows that conventional explana-
tory variables of civil war are much better at accounting
for territorial than governmental conflict. In fact, ethnic
governmental conflicts are explained largely by a discrim-
inatory political system and power-sharing. Whereas less
than one-third of all observations in our sample have a
system of ethno-political power-sharing, the share is above
60% for cases with ethnic governmental conflict
outbreaks. The latter finding suggests that consociational
regimes are particularly prone to factional fighting
over control of the executive. Yet, there may also be a
selection effect at play here, whereby countries with
higher perceived interethnic competition are more likely
to establish a system of institutional power-sharing. It is
remarkable that the Gini coefficient is the only covariate
that obtains moderate statistical significance for non-eth-
nic conflicts in the Extended HI Model. This may partly
reflect greater heterogeneity among the so-called “ideo-
logical” civil wars that cannot be accounted for with con-
ventional explanatory variables.
The results from Table 1 provide suggestive evidence
that grievances and inequalities matter for violent con-
flict, although not in the simple, individualist manner
implied by the demographic and rather apolitical argu-
ments that have been operationalized with the ELF and
Gini indices. Instead, supporting our group-based reason-
ing, political discrimination and economic marginaliza-
tion of ethnic groups both exhibit positive and statistically
significant effects on the risk of civil war. Inequity in polit-
ical participation and power might in principle be associ-
ated with armed conflict of any kind; however, whenever
access to these privileges is determined by ethnic affilia-
tion and sizable groups of society are subject to systematic
discrimination, the odds of mobilization and conflict aim-
ing at restructuring the political system increase. Large
politically discriminated groups constitute a larger threat
to the ruling regime than small, peripheral minorities
and are more likely to succeed in capturing and maintain-
ing state control. The African National Congress’ struggle
against the Apartheid regime in South Africa and the Shi-
ite resistance to Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist minority gov-
ernment constitute two relevant examples here.
Conversely, countries with large intergroup discrepancies
in wealth and economic opportunities are more likely to
face separatist challenges.17 The Chechen wars of 1994
and 1999 serve as near-ideal-type cases of this dynamic,
occurring in Russia’s least developed part of the country
(Hale and Taagepera 2002). Other relevant examples
include the Kurdish nationalist struggle in Turkey and
the Albanian uprising in Kosovo in 1999.
Out-of-Sample Predictions
So far, we have shown that our new country-level indica-
tors of ethnic and ethno-political inequalities, derived
from data on intergroup discrepancies, are better able to
distinguish between conflict and non-conflict observations
than standard vertical measures of ethnic and economic
diversity. Calculations of marginal effect for individual
variables demonstrate that this difference is not only sig-
nificant in statistical terms but also quite large in substan-
tive terms. Next, we compare the predictive performance
of the HI Model and a reduced version of the VI Model.
Given the widespread interest in the disappointing out-of-
sample prediction ability of conventional country-level
statistical models of civil war and the aspirations of fore-
casting conflict through efforts such as the Political Insta-
bility Task Force project (see Goldstone et al. 2010;
Ward, Greenhill and Bakke 2010), we wish to consider
whether more theoretically grounded measures and disag-
gregated information can improve on standard models
relying on conventional country-level indicators. We use
the observations for the 1960–1999 period to train the
models and then use the estimated probabilities for coun-
tries in 1999 to predict civil war onset out of sample,
within the next decade, 2000–2009. To facilitate direct
comparison, we exclude the VI indicators from the HI
model (unlike Model 2) and estimate both models on
the exact same sample of observations.18 The selection of
control variables is identical to the models presented
above.
A first, simple test would be to apply a binary classifica-
tion scheme and compare predicted outcomes for the
two models with data on actual outbreaks of civil war. We
first aggregate the yearly probabilities for 1999 into risk
of conflict over the subsequent decade p*19 and then
convert the continuous prediction scores into a binary
predicted onset/no onset outcome by using p* = .5 as
the threshold criterion for predicted conflicts. As shown
in Table 2, by this procedure the VI model predicts civil
war onset in 14 of the 130 sample countries during the
first decade of the new millennium (p*  .5). Four of
these predictions were accurate, whereas there were
another 22 civil wars not predicted by the model. The
remaining 104 out-of-sample observations have p* < .5
and hence are classified as no onset. 94 of these predic-
tions were true, while ten non-war observations are
missed (false positives). The HI model fares better; it suc-
cessfully predicts eight civil war onsets—twice as many as
the VI model—while the number of false onsets drops to
nine. At the same time, it correctly identifies 95 non-
onset countries, whereas the number of false negatives
(that is, missed civil wars) is 18. In other words, using
p* = .5 as the classification criterion, the HI model cor-
rectly identifies 44% of all civil war onsets and 91% of
the non-onsets during the subsequent decade; the corre-
sponding figures for the VI model are 15% and 90%,
respectively.
The appropriate prediction threshold c depends on
our relative costs for identifying true events and false pos-
itives. A more comprehensive comparison of the models’
forecasting capability across a range of different threshold
values is provided by a receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) plot. ROC curves visualize the rate of true posi-
17 As the income inequality measures are normalized by the average
national income per capita, high inequality values by design are driven by
small minority groups, which have little impact on the calculation of national
mean income.
18 A number of countries are dropped due to missing data on the Gini
indicator. The results of the out-of-sample assessment do not change if we
allow each model to be estimated on (and generate predictions for) the full
valid sample.
19 The probability of conflict over the decade is defined from the annual
probabilities p by p* = 1 (1p)10 , that is, as the complement of the proba-
bility that an observation will not see conflict in any of the 10 years.
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tives against the rate of false positives across the full
range of possible cutoff points c for a binary variable
p* > c (see Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). The better a
model predicts, the more steeply the curve rises and the
larger the area under the curve (AUC, expressed as share
of the total area of the plot). As seen in Figure 2, the
ROC curve is higher for the HI model almost across the
board and the AUC score is notably larger than that of
the VI model.20 Evidently, the predictions from the
model with group-based indicators of horizontal inequal-
ity perform better in identifying the countries that see
civil war onset out of sample than the predictions from a
model that consider standard grievance proxies based on
individual-level ethnic/economic dispersion indices.
Figure 3 provides a complementary assessment of the
discrepancy in predictions between the VI and HI mod-
els. For most countries, the predictions of the two models
are similar, but there are some notable exceptions. The
estimated risk of conflict in Russia from 2000 to 2009, for
example, is twice as high in the horizontal or group-based
model compared with the vertical inequality model,
reflecting the comparatively large between-group eco-
nomic and political inequalities in the country. Similar
patterns are found for Rwanda and Yugoslavia as well,
although in the latter case, the HI model returned a
false-positive prediction (that is, false as there was no new
conflict onset after 2000). Conversely, some countries
seem more conflict prone when judged by their ELF and
Gini indicators than by ethno-political discrimination and
income deviation for the poorest group. Tanzania and
the Philippines are both considered to be about 50%
more at risk in the VI model, but neither experienced a
civil war outbreak in the prediction period. The least
likely case that actually saw civil war out of sample is the
United States (p*HI = .17), which is perhaps a question-
able classification of the 9/11 attacks in the Uppsala
data.21 Ethiopia is the most likely candidate for conflict
that did not see a new civil war outbreak (p*HI = .77). Of
the 18 false negatives for the HI model (triangles seen in
the lower left quadrant of Figure 3), a majority either
endured a civil war at the outset of the prediction period
(six countries) or had not experienced conflict in at least
a decade (six cases)—each of which condition lowers the
a priori probability of a new civil war onset.
Sensitivity Analysis
Although the results presented thus far are encouraging
and point toward a clear conclusion, we consider a num-
ber of additional robustness tests to address likely chal-
lenges. One possible concern relates to the inclusive
nature of the ACD data, which cover all armed intrastate
conflicts with at least 25 annual casualties. This compara-
tively low fatality threshold allows recording multiple con-
flicts in the same country at the same time. It could be
that our results are driven by a number of low-intensive
conflicts and that the reported relationship between
inequality and conflict is not representative for more
severe and (arguably) more politically relevant major civil
wars.22 In Table 3, we replace the ACD conflict data with
TABLE 2. Classification Table for Out-of-Sample Prediction, 2000–
2009
Observed
VI model prediction HI model prediction
No onset Onset No onset Onset
No civil war onset 94 10 95 9
Civil war onset 22 4 18 8
(Notes. The table shows out-of-sample binary predictions using p  0.5 as clas-
sification criterion for coding civil war onset, based on a training sample 1960
–1999.)
AUC HI = 0.76
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FIG 3. Comparison of Out-of-Sample Predictions for HI and VI Mod-
els, 2000–2009
20 The predictive power of the VI model exceeds the HI model only in a
narrow band where the true positive rate is very high (>0.75) and the false
positive rate is also quite high. Since the left part of curve—where the rate of
true vs. false positives is the highest—is the most relevant, it is difficult to see
the higher performance of the VI model in this area as strong support for
that model.
21 Somewhat controversially, the UCDP/PRIO data project treats the 9/11
terrorist attacks as a civil war over the control of the US government. This
conflict would not have fulfilled the data set’s inclusion criteria for an armed
intrastate conflict had al-Qaeda limited itself to striking civilian targets, but is
included since the Pentagon qualifies as a government target.
22 For example, Fearon (2010) speculates that the low fatality threshold of
the UCDP/PRIO data leads to an overrepresentation of conflict observations
in populous and highly ethnically fractionalized countries. However, we note
that at least in our data set, the ELF score for conflict countries is actually
marginally lower when all UCDP/PRIO intrastate conflicts are considered
than when the sample is restricted to Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) major civil
wars.
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Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) civil war data. This data set is
limited to armed conflicts that generated at least 1,000
deaths in total, with a yearly average of at least 100 deaths
and with at least 100 killed on each side. Model 4 is a re-
estimation of Model 2, whereas Model 5 is identical to
Model 3 except for choice of DV.23
We immediately note the weak and insignificant effect
of ethnic diversity in Model 4, which stands in contrast to
its substantial impact in Model 2. Evidently, countries
with many ethnic groups are more likely to be challenged
by smaller (and almost always peripheral) insurgencies,
but these are unlikely to escalate to large civil wars.24 Ver-
tical income inequality, too, appears irrelevant for major
civil war risk, replicating the result for the Gini index
reported above. Inequality in wealth and political rights,
when measured between groups rather than individuals,
however, still matters. Regimes consisting of relatively
small political elites, with widespread discrimination of
large ethnic groups, are systematically and substantively
overrepresented in the conflict sample. These ethnocra-
cies (LDG at 95th percentile) are twice as conflict prone
as democratic and inclusive societies (LDG at 5th percen-
tile), all else held constant. The marginal impact of high
negative economic inequality is comparable, increasing
the estimated civil war risk more than twofold with a cor-
responding shift in values for the NHI indicator. We
interpret this as additional empirical support for out
claim that politically relevant ethnic inequality triggers
conflict, whereby the (extent of) unequal distribution of
economic and political privileges between ethnic groups
has a consistent and positive impact on the probability of
rebellion.
Next, we reassess the specific expectations on how
ethno-political and economic grievances might relate to
various types of civil war. Again, the results are encourag-
ing in the sense that our key HI indicators replicate the
pattern found in Table 1. The effect of intergroup ethnic
and political disparities is evident even in the limited
sample of severe civil wars. Economic marginalization of
one or more ethnic minorities significantly increases the
risk of separatist conflict, but not other forms of orga-
nized, state-based violence. In contrast, political discrimi-
nation of the most likely contenders for state power (that
is, the largest groups not in government) increases the
likelihood of governmental ethnic conflict by a factor of
four, but has no systematic bearing on territorial or non-
ethnic wars.25 Interestingly, our group-based controls for
downgrading and power-sharing lose much of their
impact on major civil wars. While this might indicate that
certain ethno-political constellations and events might
carry greater potential for escalating conflict to all-out
wars than others, we are reluctant to put too much
emphasis on the observed differences since these out-
comes are quite rare. Except for the positive and signifi-
cant association between ethnic fractionalization and
ethnic territorial wars, Model 5 reveals only trivial effects
for the vertical inequality measures, adding further
weight to our argument that it is the sociopolitical config-
uration of ethnicity, rather than diversity per se, that
causes civil war.
Space constraints prevent a thorough presentation of
all the additional sensitivity tests carried out to examine
the robustness of the results, and we refer to our supple-
mentary information for a complete documentation of
these tests. Among other things, we sequentially replaced
each of the four sets of inequality indicators with alterna-
tive measures. As an alternative measure of demographic
diversity, we used Montalvo and Reynal-Querol’s (2005)
ethnic polarization index (RQ) and replaced the Gini
index of income disparity with Boix’ (2008) proxies for
immobile economic assets. Neither of these changes sub-
stantively affected the behavior of the group-based
inequality indicators. Furthermore, we replaced the weak-
est link-inspired measure of ethno-political discrimination
(LDG) with a derivative of Cederman and Girardin’s
(2007) N* index, based on the EPR data and reflecting
extent of political discrimination (instead of exclusion
more generally). As expected, the N* index replicated
our earlier finding; extensive ethno-political discrimina-
tion is associated with ethnic governmental conflict, but
not with other forms of civil war. Finally, we replaced the
relative wealth/poverty indices (PHI, NHI) with a unified
between-group inequality measure, analogous to the Gini
TABLE 3. Alternative Civil War Data, 1960–1999
(4) HI Model
(5) Extended HI Model
All cw Eth. terr. Eth. gov. Non-eth.
ELF 0.183 1.834* 0.154 1.316
(0.562) (0.909) (0.825) (0.944)
Gini 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.022
(0.013) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024)
LDG 1.501** 0.767 3.654** 0.300
(0.473) (0.978) (0.749) (0.982)
PHI 0.179 0.068 0.070 1.451
(0.247) (0.289) (0.475) (1.712)
NHI 0.526** 0.549** 0.456 0.370
(0.148) (0.153) (0.414) (0.596)
Downgrade 0.332 0.279 0.601 0.112
(0.458) (0.653) (0.810) (0.942)
Power-sharing 0.317 0.349 0.871 1.066*
(0.308) (0.467) (0.554) (0.510)
Democracy 0.423 0.159 0.835 0.337
(0.492) (0.639) (0.752) (1.081)
Population 0.207* 0.461** 0.266 0.252
(0.084) (0.117) (0.187) (0.146)
GDP per capita 0.580** 0.405 0.878** 0.444
(0.186) (0.231) (0.291) (0.415)
Civil war lag 0.631 0.619 32.060** 0.094
(0.344) (0.583) (0.453) (0.607)
Constant 6.808** 10.550** 4.151* 7.200**
(1.121) (1.588) (1.980) (2.634)
Pseudo-R2 .06 .11
Observations 4,433 4,433
(Notes. Logit and mlogit coefficients with standard errors clustered on coun-
tries in parentheses. LDG, largest discriminated group; PHI, positive horizon-
tal inequality; NHI, negative horizontal inequality. Civil war data from Fearon
and Laitin (2003). **p < .01, *p < .05.)
23 In order to separate between different types of civil war, we relied on
Fearon and Laitin’s original classification of ethnic wars as well as their dis-
tinction between “center” (that is, governmental) and “exit” (territorial) civil
wars. These models contain fewer observations as Fearon and Laitin’s civil war
data only run through 1999. In models not shown, we also use a beta version
of Fearon’s (2010) updated civil war data for an extended sample period,
1960–2008. The results do not change.
24 A similar pattern is reported by Buhaug (2006) and Hegre and Sam-
banis (2006).
25 Calculations based on a shift in discrimination from the 5th to the 95th
percentile value, holding all other factors in Model 5 at median values.
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index (see Stewart, Brown and Mancini 2005) and based
on the G-Econ data set.26 This indicator performed less
well than the directed indices and failed to return a statis-
tically significant coefficient on any type of civil war out-
come. Evidently, large negative discrepancies from the
country average income level (that is, where one of a few
groups is comparably poor, and remaining groups are
relatively equal) entail larger risks than large positive
deviations (where a small elite is wealthy and most other
groups are equally poor).
Additional sensitivity tests involved investigating a possi-
ble interaction effect between economic and ethno-politi-
cal marginalization (cf. Stewart 2008; Cederman et al.
2011), without finding consistent evidence that the effect
of either HI type is conditional on the other. Regression
models limited to the post-Cold War period also yield lar-
gely similar results. We estimated logistic and linear fixed-
effects regression to correct for possible unobserved time-
independent factors that might correlate with civil war
onset. Moreover, we explored the sensitivity of our find-
ings to changes in model specifications, sample inclusion
criteria, and outlier manipulation. These tests further
increased our confidence in the importance of ethno-
political and economic grievances for understanding
where and when civil wars break out.
Conclusion
Despite widespread agreement among practitioners and
laymen that material and political inequalities matter for
popular unrest and civil war, several prominent scholars
in the empirical civil war literature dismiss this link by
referring to the alleged ubiquity of grievances that hin-
ders separating between cases of peace and war. Our
findings suggest that there are good reasons to be skepti-
cal of this claim. Theoretical misspecification and, conse-
quently, poor validity of applied measurements are a
major reason why earlier research has failed to detect
robust relationships between measures of societal
inequalities and civil war. Instead of considering interper-
sonal differences in opportunities and privileges as the
main causes of grievance in a society, we have shown that
political and socioeconomic disparities increase the risk
of civil war primarily when they overlap with ethnic
cleavages.
While several recent disaggregated studies have been
able to tease out such effects at the subnational level, this
manuscript is the first to propose global country-level
measures of both economic and political horizontal
inequality that allow us to compare the effect of such
mechanisms to standard indicators of vertical inequality
on non-ethnic as well as ethnic wars. As a way to over-
come the information loss associated with aggregation
from substate- to state-level analysis, our new indicators
operate according to the principle of the weakest link:
Which parts of the chain are most likely to trigger civil
war onset? Thus, we operationalize ethno-political griev-
ances in terms of the size of the largest discriminated
group within a country rather than considering the total
excluded population. Furthermore, we measure eco-
nomic horizontal inequality by comparing the relative
wealth of the poorest and most affluent groups in rela-
tion to the country average.
Once the conflict types have been properly unpacked,
a clear picture emerges. First, we find that the presence
of ethnic groups that are much poorer than the country
as a whole increases the risk of territorial conflict. Since
most of the very poor groups are quite small, demanding
self-determination is more viable than attempting to over-
throw the ruling elite. Second, our results indicate that
large discriminated groups boost the probability of gov-
ernmental civil wars, in part because of the evident dis-
connect between demographic power and political
privileges. In contrast, conventional proxies for ethnic
diversity and vertical economic inequality lose much of
their effect when horizontal inequalities are accounted
for. These findings are robust to a series of sensitivity
tests. Of course, it could be that further improved data
and more sophisticated indicators of individual-level
inequality could lend support to conventional grievance
arguments. However, our study casts doubt on the too-
often unreflective reliance on standard proxies, such as
ELF and the Gini coefficient, in the absence of explicit
conflict mechanisms. It would seem that, despite their
popularity in the econometric literature, the arguments
that attempt to link ethnic diversity with the outbreak of
civil war have been especially poorly articulated and insuf-
ficiently anchored in specific conflict-inducing mecha-
nisms.
The findings presented here are of significant policy
relevance, for at least two reasons. First, our group-based
indices of horizontal inequalities make us better able to
predict the locus and timing of future civil wars than do
conventional measures of ethnic fractionalization and
income disparity (for example, Goldstone et al. 2010). In
particular, the inherently dynamic feature of ethno-politi-
cal discrimination in many countries demonstrates a sys-
tematic pattern of covariation with civil war outbreak.
Second, our results verify earlier findings on the impor-
tance of ethno-nationalist politics for translating societal
inequalities into political violence. This perspective tells
us that conflicts will remain extremely difficult to resolve
and, if resolved, are likely to recur, as long as the under-
lying problems of political exclusion or horizontal eco-
nomic inequality continue to fester. Thus, including and
empowering previously discriminated populations, and
reducing inequality along ethnic lines through a fairer
distribution of public goods and privileges are more likely
to promote peace and stability than short-sighted
attempts to “strengthen the state” by supporting illegiti-
mate and exclusionary regimes in the name of “stability.”
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